NICTA

Towards Trustworthy Systems

or

The Continuing Relevance of OS Research

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Windows

An exception 06 has occured at 0028:C11B3ADC in VxD DiskTSD(03) + 00001660. This was called from 0028:C11B40C8 in VxD voltrack(04) + 00000000. It may be possible to continue normally.

* Press any key to attempt to continue.
* Press CTRL+ALT+RESET to restart your computer. You will lose any unsaved information in all applications.

Press any key to continue

What's Next?

Trust Without Trustworthiness

Core Issue: Complexity

- Massive functionality ⇒ huge software stacks
  - Expensive recalls of CE devices

- Increasing usability requirements
  - Wearable or implanted medical devices
  - Patient-operated
  - GUIs next to life-critical functionality

- On-going integration of critical and entertainment functions
  - Automotive infotainment and engine control

Our Vision: Trustworthy Systems

We will change industry's approach to the design and implementation of critical systems, resulting in true *trustworthiness*.

Trustworthy means *highly dependable*, with *hard guarantees* on security, safety or reliability.

Dealing With Complexity

- Complexity of critical devices will continue to grow
  - Critical systems with millions of lines of code (LOC)
- We need to learn to ensure *dependability* despite complexity
  - Need to *guarantee* dependability
- Correctness guarantees for MLOCs unfeasible

- Key to solution: *isolation*
  - … with controlled communication



Isolation: Physical

Dedicated CPUs for critical tasks



Cost: Space, costly interconnects, poor use of hardware

Isolation: Logical

- Protect critical components by sandboxing complex components
- Provide tightly-controlled communication channels
- *Trustworthy microkernel* provides general mechanisms to enforce isolation
- *Policy layer* defines access rights
- Microkernel becomes core of *trusted computing base*
  - System trustworthiness only as good as microkernel
  - **But**: small enough so that real trustworthiness may actually be achievable!



Dependability Requirements



NICTA Trustworthy Systems Agenda

1. **Dependable microkernel (seL4) as a rock-solid base**
   - Formal specification of functionality
   - Proof of functional correctness of implementation
   - Proof of safety/security properties
   - Timeliness guarantees

2. **Lift microkernel guarantees to whole system**
   - Use kernel correctness and integrity to guarantee critical functionality
   - Ensure correctness of balance of trusted computing base
   - Prove dependability properties of complete system

seL4 Microkernel Formal Verification



seL4 Formal Verification Summary

Kinds of properties proved

- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by abstract model
- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by executable model
  - Can prove many interesting properties on higher-level models
- Kernel never fails, behaviour is always well-defined
  - assertions never fail
  - will never de-reference null pointer
  - cannot be subverted by misformed input
- All syscalls terminate, reclaiming memory is safe, ...
- Well typed references, aligned objects, kernel always mapped…
- Access control is decidable

Effort:

- Average 6 people over 5.5 years
- About 50–100% higher than traditional (low-assurance) projects
- Resulting kernel performs at par with best L4 microkernels

Kernel Worst-Case Execution Time

Issues for WCET analysis of seL4

- Need knowledge of worst-case interrupt-latency
  - Longest non-preemptible path + IRQ delivery cost
  - seL4 runs with interrupts disabled
    - System calls in well-designed microkernel are short!
    - Strategic preemption points in long-running operations
    - Optimal average-case performance with reasonable worst-case
- Applications also need to know cost of system calls
  - Need WCET analysis of *all* possible code paths

Kernel Worst-Case Execution Time

Challenges for WCET analysis of OS kernels in general:

- Kernel code notoriously unstructured
- Low-level system-specific instructions
- Context-switching
- Assembly code

seL4-specific advantages:

- (Relatively) structured design (evolved from Haskell prototype)
- Event-based kernel (single kernel stack)
- Small (as far as operating systems go!)
- No function pointers in C
- Preemption points are explicit and preserve code structure
- Memory allocation performed in userspace

WCET analysis process



WCET Results



Execution times in μs on Freescale i.MX31 (ARM1136 @ 532 MHz)

- L2 cache and branch cache disabled
  - present limitation of analysis tools…

Improve WCET

- Knowledge about seL4 can eliminate many paths
  - Invariants proved during verification
  - E.g. loop iteration counts, non-interference
  - Can easily prove new invariants
  - Presently done manually (no proof)



Phase Two: Full-System Guarantees

- Achieved: Verification of microkernel (8,700 LOC)

- Next step: Guarantees for real-world systems (1,000,000 LOC)

Overview of Approach



- Build system with minimal TCB
- Formalize and prove security properties about architecture
- Prove correctness of trusted components
- Prove correctness of setup
- Prove temporal properties (isolation, WCET, …)
- Maintain performance

Proof of Concept: Secure Access Controller



SAC Aim



Providers A & B should not be able to leak info between each other even if they actively cooperate

Solution Overview



Specifying Security Architecture



Trusted Synthesized Drivers

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- Correct driver synthesis
  - given model of driver interface, basic behaviour, and hardware
  - driver is automatically generated
  - performance as good as hand-knitted
- Challenge: device spec
- Vision:
  - automatically extract hardware model from HDL description
  - potential impact beyond our immediate agenda





Trustworthy Systems Are Possible!

- Achieved to date:
  - First general-purpose OS kernel with
    - proof of functional correctness
    - proof of integrity enforcement
    - complete and sound timing model
  - … and high performance!
  - Secure system prototype
  - Demonstration of driver synthesis feasibility
  - Framework for reasoning about system-wide access rights
- In progress:
  - Confidentiality proof
  - General real-time capabilities
  - Eliminating holes in verification
    - Compiler, asm code, multicore…

Trustworthy Systems Are Possible!

- But still lots to be done:
  - Whole-of-system security/safety proofs
  - Truly safe languages for higher-level code
    - Haskell, RT Java with verified runtime system?
  - General component synthesis…

Obrigado!

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