

Born August 2009

A NICTA bejelentette a világ első, formális módszerekkel igazolt,



Betriebssystem mit Korrektheitsb

Forscher am Australia's ICT Research Centre of Excellence (NICTA) haben einen Betriebssystem-Microkernel entwickelt, dessen Korrektheit sie formal beweisen konnten. Der Kernel namens Secure Embedded L4 kurz seL4 - besteht aus 8700 Zeilen C-Code und soll sich für reale (Embedded-)Anwendungen wie Fahr- oder Flugzeugsteuerungen eignen. Der Beweis umfasst jedoch nur 7500 Zeilen, der Rest ist Boot-Code, der nur einmal ausgeführt wird. Laut dem zwölfköpfigen Forscherteam rund um

Dr. Klein wurd vergleichbare wiesen. Es ha um einen der sierten Bewei: Beweis behar Finzeltheorem mehr als 2001 gentliche Bew ein Programn übernommen München und Cambridge en Der formale

dass der C-C

exakt der Sy



New Scientist

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ogy a világon elsőként b es ellenőrzését.

ilási körülmények közé : goldásokba -, ahol a bea

The ultimate way to keep your computer safe from harm

FLAWS in the code, or "kernel", that sits at the heart of modern computers leave them prone to occasional malfunction and vulnerable to attack by worms and viruses. So the development of a secure generalpurpose microkernel could pave the

just mathematics, and you can reason about them mathematically," says Klein.

His team formulated a model with more than 200,000 logical steps which allowed them to prove that the program would always behave as its

aborjának számítási logi özhelyek nélkül komme ni egyedülálló teljesítmé


Does it run Linux? "We're pleased to say that it does." I resoluty, we have a para virtualized vol meguizinatusagut kapnak a szoftvertől, amely e



code




What is seL4?



What is seL4?

seL4 is the most trustworthy foundation for safety- and security-critical systems



Already in use across many domains:

automotive, aviation, space, defence, critical infrastructure, cyber-physical systems, IoT, industry 4.0, certified security...



The Performance Benchmark

Latency (in cycles) of a round-trip cross-address-space IPC on x64

World's fastest microkernel!

Source	seL4	Fisco.OC	Zircon
Mi et al, 2019	986	2717	8157
Gu et al, 2020	1450	3057	8151
seL4.systems, Nov'20	797	N/A	N/A


Temporary performance regression in Dec'19

Sources:

- Zeyu Mi, Dingji Li, Zihan Yang, Xinran Wang, Haibo Chen: "SkyBridge: Fast and Secure Inter-Process Communication for Microkernels", EuroSys, April 2020
- Jinyu Gu, Xinyue Wu, Wentai Li, Nian Liu, Zeyu Mi, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen: "Harmonizing Performance and Isolation in Microkernels with Efficient Intra-kernel Isolation and Communication", Usenix ATC, June 2020
- seL4 Performance, https://sel4.systems/About/Performance/, accessed 2020-11-08




osel4 Proofs



- Interactive theorem proving
- Shows kernel can guarantee security properties

Still only capability-based OS kernel with functional correctness proof



- Interactive theorem proving
- Shows C code correctly implements specification

- Automated tool chain
- Shows binary is correct translation of C



Functional Correctness Summary

Kinds of properties proved

- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by abstract model
- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by executable model
- Kernel never fails, behaviour is always well-defined
 - assertions never fail
 - will never de-reference null pointer
 - will never access array out of bounds
 - cannot be subverted by misformed input
- All syscalls terminate, reclaiming memory is safe, ...
- Well typed references, aligned objects, kernel always mapped...
- Access control is decidable

Can prove further properties on abstract level!

Bugs found:


- 16 in (shallow) testing
- 460 in verification
 - 160 in C,
 - 150 in design,
 - 150 in spec




Verification Assumptions

- Hardware behaves as expected
 - Formalised hardware-software contract (ISA)
 - Hardware implementation free of bugs, Trojans, ...
- 2. Spec matches expectations
 - Can only prove "security" if specify what "security" means
 - Spec may not be what we think it is
- 3. Proof checker is correct
 - Isabel/HOL checking core that validates proofs against logic

With binary verification do **not** need to trust C compiler!



Verification Cost in Context





Real-World Use



DARPA HACMS



Unmanned Little Bird (ULB)

Retrofit existing system!




Develop technology







OSEL4 ULB Architecture




Incremental Cyber Retrofit

Original **Trusted Trusted** GS Lk Mission Mission Manager Computer Miss Crypto Camera Mgr **Trusted** GPS Crypto **Local NW** Mission Manager Camera **GPS Ground Stn Link** Crypto Camera Linux GPS **Local NW** Linux Linux Local **Ground Stn Link VMM** Virt-Mach Monitor **VMM** NW Linux



Incremental Cyber Retrofit



Incremental Cyber Retrofit

Original Mission Computer

[Klein et al, CACM, Oct'18]


Mission Manager

Crypto Camera

Local NW GPS


Ground Stn Link

Linux




Issue: seL4 Objects are Low-Level

Α В




>50 capabilities for trivial program!

Simple But Non-Trivial System







Component Middleware: CAmkES



HACMS UAV Architecture



Enforcing the Architecture



Military-Grade Security

Cross-Domain Desktop Compositor



Multi-level secure terminal

- Successful trials in AU, US, UK, CA
- Commercialisation in progress

Secure communication device in use in AU, UK defence forces





Real-World Use Courtesy Boeing, DARPA



