



The seL4[®] Report

aka **State of the seL4 Ecosystem**

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Background: What is ?




seL4 is an open source, high-assurance, high-performance operating system microkernel

Available on GitHub
under GPLv2 license

World's most comprehensive
mathematical proofs of
correctness and security

World's fastest
microkernel



Piece of software that
runs at the heart of any
system and controls all
accesses to resources



What is ?




seL4 is the most trustworthy foundation for safety- and security-critical systems



**Already in use across many domains:
automotive, aviation, space, defence, critical infrastructure,
cyber-physical systems, IoT, industry 4.0, certified security...**

Unique Verification by Mathematical Proof




Brief seL4 History – 2009–2020



- 05–09: seL4 developed and **implementation correctness** proved at NICTA (Arm-32)
- Aug'11: proof of **integrity enforcement**
- Nov'11: sound & complete **worst-case execution-time (WCET) analysis**
- May'13: proof of **confidentiality enforcement** (information flow)
- Jun'13: proof of **translation correctness** (functional correctness to binary)
- Jul'14: open sourced (GPLv2)
- Jul'15: Boeing ULB helicopter flying autonomously on seL4
- Apr'17: DARPA HACMS final demos showing seL4 defeating cyber attacks
- Jul'18: proof of functional correctness for 64-bit x86
- ≈ 2018: shipped in defence products
- Apr'20: seL4 Foundation created under Linux Foundation
- Jun'20: proof of **implementation correctness on RISC-V**

**World
First!**

A large green key graphic with a circular head and a rectangular shaft. The text "seL4 over the past 15 months" is written in black on the shaft.


seL4 over the past 15 months

seL4 Progress Since Last seL4 Summit (Nov'20)



- May'21: proof of **translation correctness for RISC-V**
- Jun–Jul'21: strong growth of seL4 Foundation membership
- Jul'21: proof of **integrity enforcement for RISC-V**
- Aug'21: DARPA “steal this drone” challenge at DEFCON, *all attacks defeated*
- Dec'21: proof of **confidentiality enforcement for RISC-V**
- Jan'22: first refinement (of two) of MCS kernel functional correctness

Unique Verification by Mathematical Proof



seL4 Progress Since Last seL4 Summit (Nov'20)



- May'21: proof of **translation correctness for RISC-V**
- May'21: CSIRO abandons Trustworthy Systems Group
- Jun–Jul'21: strong growth of seL4 Foundation membership
- Jul'21: proof of **integrity enforcement for RISC-V**
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What Happened in May'21?



MUST READ: [Your cybersecurity training needs improve](#)

Innovation Oz Style: secure kernel and kids

CSIRO believes a secure kernel has all in on artificial intelligence.



Written by **Chris Duckett**, APAC Editor
Posted in Null Pointer on June 7, 2021 | Topic: Security



TC-CoR Summit, Feb'22



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Post-COVID19 Recovery

Csiro

China, Singapore dumped CSIRO se



Joseph Brookes

Senior Reporter

24 May 2021

The world-leading Australian week is in the acquisition sight Government's R&D agency.

The two potential buyers have Trusted Systems team respon



Best fitness deals 2022: \$400 off Peloton Bike, \$100 off Fitbit smartwatches



Best Peloton alternative 2022: Your next exercise bike



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Post-COVID19 Recovery

Research

Dumped CSIRO team gets funding lifeline from UNSW




Joseph Brookes

Senior Reporter

31 May 2021

The research team behind the extremely hard-to-hack microkernel seL4 has received lifeline funding to the end of the year from the University of New South Wales. The team, known as Trustworthy Systems at the CSIRO, was sensationally dumped by the agency earlier this month as part of a restructure that will see up to 70 jobs cut.


The new funding from UNSW School of Computer Science and Engineering will allow most of the Trustworthy Systems team – more than a dozen at the CSIRO and a

A large green key graphic is positioned on the left side of the slide, with its handle extending horizontally across the middle. The head of the key is a circle with a white hole in the center. The handle is a thick green bar that contains the main title text.

Trustworthy Systems

Life after CSIRO


2021: On Life Support (UNSW Bridge Funding)




What Happened to TS People?

Core Trustworthy Systems seL4 Team

Jan'20: 38 people




Jan'22: 22 people



Jan'21: 26 people




People movements



Since Sep'21:
strongest influx of new
talent in 5–10 years!

What's Behind This Development?

- CSIRO's abandonment triggered a spill of developers into the community
 - Upside: less organisational dependence, broadening of developer base
 - Downside: loss of experience at TS
 - being compensated (with delay) by strong inflow of students
- Without UNSW support, TS would be completely dispersed
 - would be hard to rebuild, might have been fatal for seL4
 - gave us the buffer needed to rebuild funding pipeline
- Broadening developer base resulting from
 - TS people moving into community
 - in the past leaving TS usually meant leaving community
 - Industrial adoption is leading to more independent skills development
 - It seems most seL4 contributors doing it as part of their job

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Let's talk Community




Main Take-Aways

- ❖ Dependence on a single organisation is dangerous
 - ❖ Main motivation for setting up the seL4 Foundation
 - ❖ Must be complemented with broadening developer base
- seL4 has become critically important for many organisations
 - ... who are prepared to support it
 - ... including multiple governments!
- seL4 no longer tied to single organisation
 - TS is still critically important, but at UNSW autonomy is not threatened
- Communication is important but difficult
 - smell of death vs encouragement to contribute back
- Media presence helps – to attract top students as well as funders


Implications: Development and Engagement




Old Model: Mostly TS




New Model: Community




Community & Deployment Growth



2022 Budgets in Comparison



Likely dwarfed by many defence and industry developments I'm not involved in!

A large green key graphic with a circular head and a rectangular shaft. The shaft is a solid green bar containing the text "What's Next for seL4?".


What's Next for seL4?

Industry: Engineering / Development




- Gov't seed funding committed
- 1 industry funder identified

Exploratory work starting NOW



- 1 gov't funder committed
- 1 industry funder identified

Work starting NOW




- 1 industry funder identified
- looking for partners


To start Q2'22?

Industry consortium

TS: Research – Keep Redefining the State of the Art



Device Virtualisation



Problem:

- Secure, low-overhead sharing of devices between VMs
- Presently ad-hoc approaches, high overheads

Solution:

- zero-copy transport layer
- standard interfaces, VirtIO
- optionally use Linux drivers in per-device VM
- investigate verifying MUX, Controller

Status:


- just started

Support



TBA (gov't org)

Verified Mapping from System Spec to Code



Aim:

- Assure mapping to enable security reasoning at system-spec level

Approach:


- Verify result state matches spec

Status:

- CapDL → init code done
- CAmkES → CapDL partial
- seL4CP → CapDL starting

Support
TBA (gov't org)

Verified Time Protection



Problem:

- Competition for limited microarchitectural hardware resources creates timing channels

Solution:

- Temporally or spatially partition all HW resources
- Prove absence of information flow

Status:

- formalised hardware state
- proved abstract infoflow
- working on integrating with seL4 proofs

Support

Australian Research Council
 USAF-AOARD
 TBA (gov't org)


Provably Secure General-Purpose OS

Aim:

- GP-OS with security policy diversity
- Proof that policy is enforced
- Performance

Approach:

- Multi-server OS with policy isolated in security server
- Object servers provable to ensure complete mediation
- Connection server authorises comms channels



Status:

- just started

Partners

Penn State

Support

TBA (gov't org)

Verified Device Drivers

Problem:


- Drivers are buggy
- Some drivers are trusted

Solution:

- Memory-safe language *Pancake*
- Certifying compiler, derived from CakeML
- Explore generating code from high-level spec

Status:

- exploratory work



Partners

Australian National University
Chalmers University

Support

TBA (gov't org)

Automated Verification of Systems Code

Problem:


- Need verified drivers, NW stacks, file systems
- Manual verification (ITP) doesn't scale to full OS

Solution:

- Use SMT solvers for “push-button” verification

Status:

- exploration



Support

TBA (gov't org)



Summary

- CSIRO's abandonment was a near-death experience for seL4
- Survived thanks to UNSW support and the community rallying behind us
- Now in a stronger position than before:
 - strong support from UNSW
 - strong support from industry
 - strong support from various governments
 - growth of developer base
 - strong influx of high-achieving students into UNSW research team
- Main challenge is number of qualified people
 - scaling up development
 - scaling up research

<https://sel4.foundation>
<https://sel4.systems>
<https://trustworthy.systems/>
<https://microkerneldude.org/>

Questions?

