



School of Computer Science & Engineering
Trustworthy Systems Group

LionsOS

**A Highly Dependable
Operating System for
Cyberphysical Systems**

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<https://microkerneldude.org/>




Cyberattacks Are Everywhere



BITSIGHT

Report Shows Cyber
Attacks on
Have Doubled



Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles Rise by 99%: Report

By CISOMAG - June 9, 2020

What Electrical
What



SECURITY March 17, 2018
Cyber attack on Saudi plant designed to
explosion

News / World

'Most serious
of thousands
RAND / Research & Commentary / Blog /
**Threats to America's Critical Infrastructure Are
Now a Terrifying Reality**

AP By Associated

COMMENTARY — Feb 12, 2024


Increasingly used by
• organised crime
• state actors




causes delay at Zurich Airport



Core Problem: Complexity



Standard Approach: Patch-and-Pray





We Need To Do Better!

We need principled solutions based on solid foundations!


seL4 Mathematically Proved Secure



- Comprehensive formal verification
- Only verified OS with fine-grained protection (capabilities)
- Only protected-mode RTOS with sound and complete WCET analysis
- World's fastest microkernel


Open Source!

- Present limitations
- initialisation code not verified
 - MMU, caches modelled abstractly
 - Multicore not yet verified



sel4 Capabilities: Fine-Grained Protection

- Enforce *least privilege*
- No communication unless explicitly authorised!



No capabilities?
You're not serious
about security!



The Benchmark for Performance



Round-trip cross-address-space IPC on 64-bit Intel Skylake

Smaller
is better

World's fastest
microkernel!

	seL4	Fiasco.OC aka L4Re	Google Zircon
Latency (cycles)	986	2717	8157
Mandatory HW cost* (cycles)	790	790	790
Overhead absolute (cycles)	196	1972	7367
Overhead relative	25%	240%	930%

*: The Cost of SYCALL + 2 × SWAPGS + SYSRET = 395 cycles, times 2 for round-trip


Source:

Zeyu Mi, Dingji Li, Zihan Yang, Xinran Wang, Haibo Chen: "SkyBridge: Fast and Secure Inter-Process Communication for Microkernels", EuroSys, April 2019

se14 Used in Real-World Systems



Autonomous vehicles



Satellites

Critical infrastructure protection



Secure communication device
In use in multiple defense forces



Cars

se14 “World’s Most Secure Drone”



← Tweet



We brought a hackable quadcopter with defenses built on our HACMS program to [@defcon](#) [#AerospaceVillage](#). As program manager [@raymondrichards](#) reports, many attempts to breakthrough were made but none were successful. Formal methods FTW!

DEFCON'22



Why Aren't We Done Yet?

seL4 A Microkernel



Microkernel:

- OS code that must execute in privileged mode
- Everything else belongs in user mode servers
- Servers are subject to the microkernel's security enforcement!

Consequence:

- Small: 10 kLOC
- Only fundamental, policy-free mechanisms
- No application-oriented services/abstractions
- **BYO file system, memory manager, device drivers**

seL4 Experience of the First 10+ Years




seL4's assurance and power is unrivalled, but:

- good design of seL4-based systems requires deep expertise
- a secure microkernel doesn't guarantee a secure system

seL4 needs an OS that:

- provides "usual" OS services
- is easy to use
- is performant
- **is secure**



Enter LionsOS

Stop The Train Wrecks!



Lions OS: Secure, Fast, Adaptable




Aim 1: *Practical, easy-to-use, open-source OS for wide range of embedded/IoT/cyberphysical use cases*

Aim 2: *Best-performing microkernel-based OS ever*

Aim 3: *Provably secure OS*

LionsOS: Highly Modular OS



LionsOS Design Principle: KISS



Keep it simple, stupid!

- Strong separation of concerns
- Simplest implementation possible
- Least privilege


Implications:

- Use-case-specific instead of “universal” policies
- Use-case diversity by swapping policy modules!

Simple programming model:

- “Microkit” abstraction layer
- Event-driven programming model
- Static architecture
- Location-transparent components

Example: Networking Subsystem




Networking Detail



Zero-copy communication:

- Lock-free, single-producer, single-consumer, bounded queues
- Synchronised by semaphores



Benefits:


- simple components
- location transparency
- suitable for verification

Legacy Re-use: Driver VMs



Can re-use unmodified Linux drivers:

- Transparently use driver VM instead of native driver
- develop Lions-OS components on Linux



Comparison to Linux on i.MX8M (Armv8)



Linux:

- NW driver: 4k lines
- NW system total: 1M lines



Performance?

Lions OS:

- NW driver: 700 lines
- MUX: 400 lines
- Copier: 200 lines
- IP stack: much simpler, client library
- shared NW system total: < 2,000 lines


Written by second-year student!

Evaluation Setup




- External load generator
- Measures throughput, latency
- Client echoes packets

Performance: i.MX8M, 1Gb/s Ethernet



Single-core configuration

Performance: i.MX8M, 1Gb/s Ethernet




Multicore configuration




How About Verification?

Verifying the Microkit: libmicrokit



Verifying the Microkit: System Initialisation



Verifying LionsOS

- Microkit programming model:

- simple event handlers
- strictly sequential code

Very little time spent on debugging component logic

Suitable for SMT solvers

- Fine-grained modularity:

- concurrency by distribution, “tamed” concurrency
- complex signalling protocols

Protocol bugs are mostly performance problems

Ideal for model checking!


Automatic proofs!

Lions OS Verification Status


- Network-layer protocols *automatically* proved deadlock-free
 - eliminated multiple performance bugs
 - verification supports aggressive optimisation!
- One component (copier) *automatically* verified with SMT solver
 - functional correctness (subject to correctness of neighbours)
 - confident can prove global properties
- Exploring refinement proof of MSpec

Challenge:

- Proving global security properties!



Aim: Verified LionsOS





Summary: LionsOS


What's In a Name?

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Lions

John Lions


Article [Talk](#)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



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Summarize the key points.
Review of all important aspects

John Lions





LionsOS Release 0.2 (July'24)


- Native serial, Ethernet, I2C drivers
- Native NFS client, Python interpreter (MicroPython)
- Native components in Rust supported
- Native web server (in Python)
- Driver VMs: graphics, touch screen, audio
- Next release (0.3 – Oct'24): Native file system

Overview: <https://trustworthy.systems/projects/LionsOS/>
Docs: <https://lionsos.org/>
Source: <https://github.com/au-ts/lionsos/>
License: 2-clause BSD

Open Source!



Web Server Based on LionsOS



<https://beta.sel4.systems/>

LionsOS Support



• NIO America  **NIO**

• DARPA PROVERS program
collaborating with Collins Aerospace



• Cyberagentur (Germany) EvIT program
collaborating with PlanV, U Gothenburg



Foundations (Microkit, device driver framework) supported by:



in association with
**National Cyber
Security Centre**





Security is no excuse
for bad performance!

<https://trustworthy.systems>

