Trustworthy Systems

SecCSL: security concurrent separation logic

Authors

Gidon Ernst and Toby Murray

    School of Computer Science and Engineering
    UNSW,
    Sydney 2052, Australia

Abstract

We present SecCSL, a concurrent separation logic for proving expressive, data-dependent information flow security properties of low-level programs. SecCSL is considerably more expressive, while being simpler, than recent compositional information flow logics that cannot reason about pointers, arrays etc. To capture security concerns, SecCSL adopts a relational semantics for its assertions. At the same time it inherits the structure of traditional concurrent separation logics; thus SecCSL reasoning can be automated via symbolic execution. We demonstrate this by implementing SecC, an automatic verifier for a subset of the C programming language, which we apply to a range of benchmarks.

BibTeX Entry

  @inproceedings{Ernst_Murray_19,
    author           = {Gidon Ernst and Toby Murray},
    booktitle        = { International Conference on Computer Aided Verification},
    month            = jul,
    pages            = {208--230},
    paperurl         = {https://trustworthy.systems/publications/papers/Ernst_Murray_19.pdf},
    publisher        = {Springer},
    title            = {{SecCSL}: Security Concurrent Separation Logic},
    year             = {2019}
  }

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