Trustworthy Systems

Proving the absence of microarchitectural timing channels


Scott Buckley, Robert Sison, Nils Wistoff, Curtis Millar, Toby Murray, Gerwin Klein and Gernot Heiser

UNSW Sydney

University of Melbourne

ETH Z├╝rich




Microarchitectural timing channels are a major threat to computer security. A set of OS mechanisms called time protection was recently proposed as a principled way of preventing information leakage through such channels and prototyped in the seL4 microkernel. We formalise time protection and the underlying hardware mechanisms in a way that allows linking them to the information-flow proofs that showed the absence of storage channels in seL4.

Scott Buckley and Robert Sison were joint lead authors

BibTeX Entry

    author           = {Scott Buckley and Robert Sison and Nils Wistoff and Curtis Millar and Toby Murray and Gerwin Klein
                        and Gernot Heiser},
    howpublished     = {},
    journal          = {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.17046},
    paperurl         = {},
    title            = {Proving the Absence of Microarchitectural Timing Channels},
    year             = {2023}