Verified protection model of the seL4 microkernel
Authors
NICTA\ UNSW
Abstract
This paper presents a machine-checked high-level security analysis of seL4 — an evolution of the L4 kernel series targeted to secure, embedded devices. We provide an abstract specification of the seL4 access control system in terms of a classical take-grant model together with a formal proof of its decidability. Using the decidability property we show how confined subsystems can be enforced. All proofs and specifications in this paper are machine-checked and developed in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL
BibTeX Entry
@techreport{Elkaduwe_KE_07:tr,
address = {Sydney},
author = {Elkaduwe, Dhammika and Klein, Gerwin and Elphinstone, Kevin},
institution = {NICTA},
keywords = {sel4, access control, proof, isabelle/hol},
month = oct,
number = {NRL-1474},
paperurl = {https://trustworthy.systems/publications/nicta_full_text/1474.pdf},
title = {Verified Protection Model of the {seL4} Microkernel},
year = {2007}
}
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