Verified protection model of the seL4 microkernel
Authors
NICTA\ UNSW
Abstract
This paper presents a machine-checked high-level security analysis of seL4—an evolution of the L4 kernel series targeted to secure, embedded devices. We provide an abstract specification of the seL4 access control system in terms of a classical take-grant model together with a formal proof of how confined subsystems can be enforced. All proofs and specifications in this paper are machine-checked and developed in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
BibTeX Entry
@inproceedings{Elkaduwe_KE_08,
address = {Toronto, Canada },
author = {Elkaduwe, Dhammika and Klein, Gerwin and Elphinstone, Kevin},
booktitle = {Verified Software: Theories, Tools and Experiments},
editor = {{Natarajan Shankar and Jim Woodcock}},
isbn = {3540878726},
month = oct,
pages = {99--115},
paperurl = {https://trustworthy.systems/publications/nicta_full_text/209.pdf},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {Verified Protection Model of the {seL4} Microkernel},
year = {2008}
}
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