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We investigate kernel mechanisms for enforcing system security policies. In particular, we investigate kernel mechanisms for eliminating timing side channels that are general and minimal enough to merit inclusion into a general-purpose production version of the kernel (i.e. one not only meant for deployments where timing channels are a concern). I am designing kernel mechanisms in seL4. seL4 is a capability based general-purpose microkernel. The design goal of seL4 is to provide a minimal set of mechanisms for high assurance systems, forming a good platform for system security research. Furthermore, we expect that our contributions will benefit not only seL4 but also other kernels or hypervisors.

Projects

Publications

• Google Scholar profile
• Best Papers
• TS Group Papers (2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014)

Best Papers

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia and Gernot Heiser Time protection: The missing OS abstraction EuroSys Conference, Dresden, Germany, March, 2019 Best Paper Award

Trustworthy Systems Group Papers

2019

		Qian Ge Principled elimination of microarchitectural timing channels through operating-system enforced time protection PhD Thesis, UNSW, Sydney, Australia, October, 2019
		Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia and Gernot Heiser Time protection: The missing OS abstraction EuroSys Conference, Dresden, Germany, March, 2019 Best Paper Award

2018

		Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom and Gernot Heiser No security without time protection: we need a new hardware-software contract Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems (APSys), Korea, August, 2018 Best Paper Award Complete timing-channel data for evaluated x86 and Arm platforms.
		Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock and Gernot Heiser A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp. 1-27, April, 2018

2017

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Frank Li and Gernot Heiser Your processor leaks information — and there's nothing you can do about it arXiv preprint, 2017

2016

Fangfei Liu, Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Frank Mckeen, Carlos Rozas, Gernot Heiser and Ruby B Lee CATalyst: defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing IEEE Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture, pp. 406–418, Barcelona, Spain, March, 2016

2015

		Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Fangfei Liu, Ruby B. Lee and Gernot Heiser Mapping the Intel last-level cache The Cryptology ePrint Archive, September, 2015
		Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser and Ruby B Lee Last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 605–622, San Jose, CA, US, May, 2015

2014

David Cock, Qian Ge, Toby Murray and Gernot Heiser The last mile: An empirical study of some timing channels on seL4 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 570–581, Scottsdale, AZ, USA, November, 2014