Robert is broadly interested in discovering how best to design and construct software systems with formally proved functional-correctness and security properties at scale. Their current research concerns the formal verification of operating systems to enforce increasingly useful forms of information-flow security, also known as confidentiality.
More contact information is available at the Contact page.
Robert is a visiting scientist who contributes to the Time Protection verification project.
Robert's PhD with Trustworthy Systems and UNSW Sydney was supervised by Carroll Morgan, Toby Murray, and Kai Engelhardt.
For their machine-checked Isabelle/HOL formalisation of a compiler and proof that it preserves concurrent value-dependent noninterference, please see the COVERN project.
Previously at NICTA and Data61, Robert was a research engineer developing software for the eChronos/SMACCM project, during which time they ported eChronos to the PowerPC e500. Subsequently as a research engineer they developed proofs for the Information Flow project.
Prior to that, they were a software engineer at Open Kernel Labs, Inc. and General Dynamics C4 Systems, where they spent most of their time developing device-driver paravirtualisation stacks for use by Android and Linux kernel instances on a dual-personality smartphone.
Robert holds the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy (Computer Science and Engineering), Master of Information Technology with Excellence, and Bachelor of Engineering (Computer Engineering) with First Class Honours, all from the University of New South Wales.
Robert holds the position of Research Fellow in Verified Operating System Security with the School of Computing and Information Systems at the University of Melbourne.
2021 Australian Museum Eureka Prize for Outstanding Science in Safeguarding Australia, with co-entrants Toby Murray and Mark Beaumont (for research contributions to the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor)
||Robert Sison, Scott Buckley, Toby Murray, Gerwin Klein and Gernot Heiser|
Formalising the prevention of microarchitectural timing channels by operating systems
International Symposium on Formal Methods (FM), Lübeck, Germany, March, 2023
|Robert Sison and Toby Murray|
Verified secure compilation for mixed-sensitivity concurrent programs
Journal of Functional Programming, Volume 31, pp. e18, 2021
Proving confidentiality and its preservation under compilation for mixed-sensitivity concurrent programs
PhD Thesis, UNSW, October, 2020
||Robert Sison and Toby Murray|
Verifying that a compiler preserves concurrent value-dependent information-flow security
International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving, pp. 27:1–27:19, Portland, USA, September, 2019
|Toby Murray, Robert Sison and Kai Engelhardt|
COVERN: A logic for compositional verification of information flow control
European Conference on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), London, United Kingdom, April, 2018
Per-thread compositional compilation for confidentiality-preserving concurrent programs
2nd Workshop on Principles of Secure Compilation, Los Angeles, January, 2018
|Toby Murray, Robert Sison, Ed Pierzchalski and Christine Rizkallah|
Compositional verification and refinement of concurrent value-dependent noninterference
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 417–431, Lisbon, Portugal, June, 2016