Robert is broadly interested in discovering how best to design and construct software systems with formally proved functional-correctness and security properties at scale. His current research concerns the formal verification of operating systems to enforce increasingly useful forms of information-flow security, also known as confidentiality.
Robert is a visiting scientist who contributes to the Time Protection verification project.
Previously at NICTA and Data61, Robert was a research engineer developing software for the eChronos/SMACCM project, during which time he ported eChronos to the PowerPC e500. Subsequently as a research engineer he developed proofs for the Information Flow project.
Prior to that, he was a software engineer at Open Kernel Labs, Inc. and General Dynamics C4 Systems, where he spent most of his time developing device-driver paravirtualisation stacks for use by Android and Linux kernel instances on a dual-personality smartphone.
Robert holds the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy (Computer Science and Engineering), Master of Information Technology with Excellence, and Bachelor of Engineering (Computer Engineering) with First Class Honours, all from the University of New South Wales.
Robert holds the position of Research Fellow in Verified Operating System Security with the School of Computing and Information Systems at the University of Melbourne.
||Robert Sison and Toby Murray|
Verifying that a compiler preserves concurrent value-dependent information-flow security
International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving, pp. 27:1–27:19, Portland, USA, September, 2019
|Toby Murray, Robert Sison and Kai Engelhardt|
COVERN: A logic for compositional verification of information flow control
European Conference on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), London, United Kingdom, April, 2018
Per-thread compositional compilation for confidentiality-preserving concurrent programs
2nd Workshop on Principles of Secure Compilation, Los Angeles, January, 2018
|Toby Murray, Robert Sison, Ed Pierzchalski and Christine Rizkallah|
Compositional verification and refinement of concurrent value-dependent noninterference
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 417–431, Lisbon, Portugal, June, 2016